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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

TORTS-LIABILITY OF NEGLIGENT DRIVER TO ONE WHO GOES TO HIS
RESCUE-Where plaintiff went to the aid of defendant who lay pinned beneath
the wheel of his car after a collision caused ·by his own negligent driving, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that plaintiff could recover for injuries sustained
when the car rolled back upon her as she was attempting to remove defendant.
Brugh v. Bigelow, (Mich. 1944) 16 N.W. (2d) 668.
Courts have quite generally found a liability on the part of defendant toward
a plaintiff who is injured in rescuing a third person from a situation of danger
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RECENT DECISIONS

which defendant negligently created. There are few decisions, however, involving recovery against the person rescued where he has been the negligent par!=J.
The problem of tort liability would seem to be the same in both instances, and
there are numerous cases holding the defendant liable for his negligence in placing
third persons in a position of peril when plaintiff is injured in attempting a rescue.
If the tests for duty, breach, a1J,d cause are met in one instance, it is difficult to
see why they are not fulfilled in the other situation also. The primary difficulty
in either case seems to lie in the elements of duty and causation. The generally
accepted criterion for determining whether defendant owes a duty to plaintiff
has been set forth by Justice Cardozo in the famed Palsgraf case,1 in the rule that
a person has a duty to use due care toward all those who might foreseeably be
subjected to danger from his negligent acts. Applying this test, is it forseeable
that a rescuer like the plaintiff may come upon the scene and be subjected to
danger when the defendant drives negligently? It is arguable that a_ rescue cannot be foreseen, that it is the extraordinary occurrence rather than the ordinary
event. But on the other hand, defendant has created a dangerous situation and
it may be expected that passers-by, acting from humanitarian instincts, will attempt to help those in trouble. As the court in the principal case remarked,
"Defendant's claim that he owed himself and his rescuers no duty is without
merit. His cries for help belied his claimed freedom from duty." 2 Assuming
the hurdle of duty is surmounted,3 there remains the problem of whether the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury? The court in
the case at bar considered plaintiff's injury a foreseeable consequence of defendant's negligence and therefore held the latter liable. The court said, "This was
a roadside where passers-by would be expected to stop and render needful assistance. . .. Defendant further argues that rescue is unusual and that it is an
unusual thing and therefore not to be anticipated that passers-by would respond
to relieve known dire necessity resulting from an automobile accident. We
understand the contrary to be the case." 4 The fact that the rescue was voluntary
and deliberate, and not an impulsive act has not generally been held to break the
causal chain. 5 Likewise, the consensus of judicial opinion seems to be that it is not
contributory negligence to rush to the rescue of another unless plaintiff was
acting with positive necklessness. 6 The English courts have taken a somewhat
1

Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company, 248 N.Y. 339 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
16 N.W. (2d) 668 at 671. Furthermore the fact that plaintiff has no duty to
rescue defendant should not affect defendant's duty toward him.
·
8
Many courts are inclined to ignore it altogether, simply assuming that such duty
exists. The court apparently took this position in the principal-case.
4
16 N.W. (2d) 668 at 671. A note in 58 L. Q. REv. 299 at 300 (1942) declares, "The defendant is liable because he has been negligent in creating a dangerous
situation which he should have foreseen might induce plaintiff to act in a particular
way••••"
·
5
This is well brought out by Justice Cardozo in Wagner v. International Railway
Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921). 19 A.L.R. 13 (1922) states, ''The proximate cause of injury to one who voluntarily interposes to save the lives of persons imperiled by the negligence of another is the negligence which caused the peril."
6
''The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence
to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such circumstances as to constitute rash- _
ness..•." Eckert v. Long Island Railway, 43 N.Y. 502 at 506 (1871). And a note in
2
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narrower .view in the "rescue" cases, finding liability only under special cir-cqmstances such as in Haynes v. Harwood 1 where a policeman stopped a runaway horse. The court held the driver of the horse liable because plaintiff as a
police officer had a special duty to protect the public safety. 'J;'he decision seemed
to imply that a mere passer-by, having no such duty, might not recover. However, in a more recent case, Morgan v. Aylen,8 plaintiff was permitted to sue for
injuries sustained when he leaped in front of defendant's motorcycle to rescue
a child. The court rejected the distinction that in Haynes v. Harwood plaintiff
was acting under a positive legal duty in stopping the runaway horse, whereas
he was a mere volunteer in Morgan v. Aylen. Thus the English decisions would
seem to be tending toward the American view.9 A few jurisdictions in this
country have been reluctant, however, to find liability where plaintiff is hurt in
effecting the rescue of a defendant who has put himself in a position of peril.
Confusion arises perhaps because of the theory that the defendant owes no legal
duty to himself. Ergo, some courts reason that he owes no duty to the person
who rescues him. The Iowa court in Saylor v. Parsons 10 appeared to be thinking
along these lines when it held that plaintiff could not recover from a careless
workman for injuries sustained in rescuing him from a falling wall. The court
said, "Undoubtedly Parsons owed the moral duty of protecting his own person
from harm. But the love of life is regarded as a sufficient inducement to selfpreservation. . . . Where no one else is concerned, the individual may incur
dangers and risks as he may choose, and in doing so he violates no legal duty." 11
Admitted that "where no one else is concerned" the defendant may take risks
with impunity, can it be argued that someone else-a possible rescuer-is concerned? In all fairness it would seem that defendant's negligence should not
constitute a bar to plaintiff's recovery. The report in the instant case states "that
defendant called for assistance and that plaintiff after removing the passenger,
Swan aided in removing defendant from underneath the car • . • that in lifting
the car and in the act of removing defendant the defendant's automobile righted
itself, rolled backwards, and struck plaintiff, throwing her to the ground and
seriously injuring her•..." 12 The decision reached in the Brugh case would
seem to be a desirable one both in point of law and- on the facts.
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58 L. Q. REv. 299 suggests that contributory negligence ori the part of the person
rescued should make no difference as to plaintiff's rights.
7 I K.B. 146 (1935).
8 1 All E. R. 489 (1942).
9 Discussions of the cases appear in 58 L. Q. REv. 299 (1942); 75 IrusH LAW
TIMES 113 (1941).
10 122 Iowa 679, 98 N.W. 500 (1904).
11 Id. at 683.
12 16 N.W. (2d) 668 at 669.

